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ABSTRACT 
Tenure is sometimes charged as giving faculty lifetime job security, 
with li t t le accountabi l i ty and sporadic moni to r ing of pe r fo rmance . 
Scholars have traditionally defended tenure as necessary for academic 
freedom. This paper takes a different approach by examining the acade-
mic "employment contract relationship," and explaining how tenure can 
lead to bargaining conflict. 
Tenure is costly to the university but extremely valued by the faculty 
member. The opportunity cost of granting tenure to someone is the lost 
teaching and research output of younger people who cannot be hired in 
future. Tenure is necessary because without it, incumbents would never 
recommend hiring people who might be better than they are, for fear of 
being replaced. Tenure is also efficient because faculty have better infor-
mation about incumbents than either university administrators or outside 
consultants. Tenure is therefore necessary to motivate older faculty to 
hire the best. With staff budget dollars able to be shifted back or for-
wards across time periods, tenure secures the truthful revelation of who 
are the good candidates over all periods, and the university is guaranteed 
that those who are in the best position to judge (namely, faculty rather 
than administrators) have every incentive to make the best decisions. It 
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follows, then, that the naive suggestion to get rid of tenure so that older, 
expensive professors can be fired and replaced with younger, cheaper 
professors would be disastrous in the long run. 
A simple model is presented explaining why (a) recent cutbacks in 
government grants, (b) cost pressures on university budgets, (c) limits to 
tuition increases, and (d) declining interests in attending a less "excellent" 
university have all resulted in pressure on tenure. Because there is no pre-
viously agreed-to mechanism in place to adjust staff, university adminis-
trations and faculty unions are not so much bargaining over an acceptable 
contract outcome as they are contesting the very rules of the bargaining 
game. Accordingly, unless tenure is reconsidered, universit ies may 
increasingly face bargaining conflict. Tenure could be reformed by mak-
ing the term of tenure limited but related to rank, and establishing a maxi-
mum eligibility period during which a faculty may apply for promotion. 
RÉSUMÉ 
On accuse la permanence de donner une sécurité d'emploi absolue 
aux professeurs, à qui on ne demande pas de rendre des comptes et dont 
la performance n'est contrôlée que de temps en temps. Les universitaires 
ont traditionnellement défendu la permanence car elle est nécessaire à la 
l iberté académique . Cette étude adopte une approche dif férente en 
examinant les rapports contractuels des universitaires et en expliquant 
comment la permanence peut mener aux conflits lors des négocitations. 
La permanence coûte cher à l 'université mais les universitaires la 
trouvent essentielle. En donnant la permanence d 'emploi à quelqu'un 
l 'univers i té perd la possibilité de profiter de l 'enseignement et des 
recherches des jeunes. La permanence est nécessaire car, sans elle, les 
titulaires ne recommanderaient jamais l ' embauche de gens que leur 
seraient supérieurs, de peur de se faire remplacer. La permanence est 
efficace aussi, car les professeurs ont de meilleurs renseignements sur les 
t i tu la i res que les adminis t ra teurs univers i ta i res ou des exper ts de 
l ' ex t é r i eu r . La p e r m a n e n c e est donc nécessa i re pour mot iver les 
professeurs âgés à engager les meilleurs candidats possibles. Étant donné^ 
les fluctuations budget selong l'époque, la permanence permet d'obtenir 
un aperçu véridique des bons candidats à toute époque, ce qui garantit à 
l 'université que ceux qui sont le mieux placés pour juger (c'est-à-dire les 
professeurs plutôt que les administrateurs) ont tout intérêt à prendre les 
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meilleures décisions. Il s 'ensuit que la suggestion naïve d 'abol i r la 
permanence afin de pourvoir renvoyer les professeurs âgés pour les 
remplacer par de jeunes professeurs qui coûtent moins cher serait, à long 
terme, désastreuse. 
Nous présentons un modèle simple qui expl ique pourquoi des 
facteurs tels (a) les réductions récentes de subventions gouvernementales, 
(b) les pressions sur les budgets universitaires, (c) les limites imposées 
sur les augmentations de frais de scolarité (d) un intérêt réduit pour les 
universités estimées, à tort ou à raison inférieures, ont tous remis en 
ques t ion la p e r m a n e n c e . C o m m e il n ' e x i s t e ac tue l l emen t aucun 
mécanisme d'ajustement de personnel, les adminstrations universitaires 
et les syndicats des professeurs , plutôt que de négocier un contrat 
acceptable, contestent les règles mêmes du jeu. On pourrait pourtant 
réformer la permanence en limitant la période de la permanence tout en 
la rapportant au rang, et en établissant une période maximale d'éligibilité 
pendant laquelle un professeur pourrait fair une demande de promotion. 
INTRODUCTION 
Universities in Canada are facing pressures to "reinvent" them-
selves, and there is no shortage of commentary and free advice. With 
dwindling finances and slower job growth, the public appears less for-
giving of academic privilege than in the past. Tenure is increasingly seen 
as protecting 'deadwood' faculty with lifetime job security, with little 
accountability and sporadic monitoring of performance.1 
Scholars have traditionally defended tenure as an institution to pre-
serve academic freedom. This paper takes a different approach by exam-
ining tenure as part of the academic "employment contract relationship," 
and explaining how tenure can lead to conflict between faculty interests 
and management goals. In an ideal world, faculty members would receive 
remuneration and work conditions conducive to promoting excellence 
(somehow defined). Similarly, the university would strive for excellence 
by hiring and promoting the best people. But these goals cannot be 
achieved without substantial monitoring and information costs, so I shall 
simply assert that the university contract should be, as much as possible, 
of the self-enforcing, incentive-compatible kind.2 The task, then, is to 
devise under conditions of imperfect information and uncertainty a con-
t r ac tua l a r r a n g e m e n t which ba l ances min ima l m o n i t o r i n g cos t s 
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(self-enforcing feature) with maximum productivity (incentive-compatible 
feature), while enhancing the reputation and credibility of the university. 
A WORKING DEFINITION OF TENURE 
There is no special definition of tenure in statute law pertaining to 
academic appointments. For my purposes, I shall define tenure to mean 
on-going contrac tual employmen t in an academic posit ion. In more 
detail, the period of employment is often set out in an explicit contract 
for many individuals. Where it is not, in the sense that employment is 
considered ongoing, employment for an individual can be terminated by 
con t ingenc ies set out in advance , or upon a given period of notice. 
Where there is a collective agreement, these conditions may be written 
down in a formal contract. Even if there is no specific contract, there is 
often informal understanding about the meaning of tenure among univer-
sity administrations and academic faculty as follows. If an academic has 
an appointment "with tenure," it is acknowledged that this professor 
shall have cont inuing employment with the university as long as the 
occupied position exists in the university. Further, the university under-
takes to allow the incumbent to occupy that position even if the univer-
sity could find a less expensive, or younger, or better qualified, or more 
desirable (in some sense) individual. Tenure is a bit of a "one way" rela-
tionship, however, in the sense that the individual academic is not bound 
to the university and may depart whenever convenient, but the university 
is not allowed to dismiss the tenured faculty member at pleasure. At the 
same time, tenured employment does not constitute immunity f rom fur-
ther evaluation, ongoing accountability, or a continuing obligation to 
perform duties as set out by contract or custom. Furthermore, the defini-
tion of "permanent ," or more accurately, when the period of tenure is 
understood to end, is left quite open. In some universities, the under-
standing is that tenure applies to some mandatory retirement age. At uni-
versities which do not have mandatory retirement, it could mean literally 
life time employment. In other words, the understanding of "permanent" 
can be specific to particular universities. 
Now, the notion of a career-long contractual employment arrange-
ment raises some interesting questions. The public has some idea of the 
t each ing func t ion of a universi ty, perhaps ex t rapola t ing f r o m their 
knowledge of high school instruction. But it is the research function that 
is least well understood. Essentially, research requires a long gestation 
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period. It is not possible to hire academics to conduct research on a day-
labour basis. While it might be possible to hire qualified individuals to 
deliver some lectures on a short term basis, it is not conceivable to have 
academics come in for a week or two to find a cure for a particular med-
ical ailment, write a novel or historical treatise, compose a concerto, or 
set up a particle accelerator laboratory, and then leave. Therefore, if it is 
necessary to engage academics for these functions on a long term basis, 
some form of contractual relationship for continuing employment must 
be established. So if career-long contracts have any rationale, then there 
is f r e e d o m to deviate f r o m a pay structure which gives individuals 
exactly what they are worth at each and every instant of their employ-
ment. In other words, there may be reasons why one might wish to pay 
s o m e o n e less or m o r e than they are s t r ic t ly p r o d u c i n g at a g iven 
moment , so long as the total sum paid over the entire contract is the 
"fair" amount. An employer-university adopting this type of wage pro-
fi le is bound to draw notice that it is overpaying its older professors 
when there are good young professors available in the market. And if the 
f r ivolous answer is that these senior academics have tenure, the next 
question is bound to be one of incentives to remove 'shirking ' when 
there is such iron-clad job security and so little 'accountability.' 
To gain s o m e insight in to the role of tenure , it is necessary to 
desc r ibe the ca reer h ie ra rchy and pay s t ruc tures that a t tend many 
Canadian universities. 
CAREER LADDERS: HIRING, TENURE AND PROMOTION 
In Canada, a typical university career might involve the following 
sequence: acquir ing a Ph.D. af ter years of study, securing a facul ty 
appointment, attaining tenure after a probationary period, and then pro-
gression through the academic ranks from assistant to associate to full 
professor, and eventually retirement. Consider first the hiring decision. 
Individuals attempt to convince hiring committees of their superior quali-
fications; and hiring committees try to select individuals who promise the 
greatest future contributions. This is the classic signaling/screening prob-
lem in economics, with the emphasis on screening at the hiring stage, 
because the university has less reliable information on the talents and 
qualities of the prospective candidates. Accordingly, the Ph.D. degree, 
especially if f r o m a well-regarded institution, is usually adopted as a 
s c reen ing dev ice by un ivers i t i es , as well as a necessa ry s igna l ing 
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mechanism by candidates themselves. In sum, the Ph.D. requirement for 
most applications serves mainly to screen out the less qualified. However, 
the salary structure (discussed in the next section) also plays a role. 
Once an individual obtains a probationary appointment, the next bar-
rier is tenure. The university now has more, but still imperfect, informa-
tion on the candidate's expected future productivity. The candidate also 
has had some opportunity to demonstrate teaching and research talents. 
Despite more information available, the fundamental rationale behind 
the process of tenure (but not the institution of tenure, which is discussed 
below) is the same as the hiring decision; namely, to decide which indi-
viduals should be granted tenure. The university is therefore interested in 
dis t inguishing those who did not live up to expectat ions f rom those 
demonstrating acceptable long run potential. The unique characteristic of 
tenure involves the termination of those refused tenure under the "up or 
out" policies of most Canadian universities on the one hand, and the 
granting of a "l ifetime" contract to those successful.3 The tenure decision 
remains f raugh t with uncertainty and asymmetr ic information. More 
information will be available if the tenure decision date is postponed; on 
the other hand, the consequences of an unfavourable decision for candi-
dates is harsher if the decision is made later rather than sooner. This 
problem is intractable since there will always be uncertainty and imper-
fect informat ion unless the tenure date coincides with the ret irement 
date, a reductio ad absurdum position. 
The focus on information asymmetr ies (rather than the academic 
f reedom issue) sheds a different light on the institution of tenure. Tenure, 
if designed properly, is directly related to university excellence and qual-
i ty f a c u l t y t h r o u g h t h e l e n s of " s e l f - e n f o r c i n g , " " i n c e n t i v e -
compatible" contractual arrangements. Carmichael 's (1988) treatment of 
the efficiency of tenure can be summarized as follows. Tenure is costly 
to the univers i ty but ex t remely valued by the facul ty member . The 
opportunity cost of granting tenure to an incumbent is the lost teaching 
and research output of younger people who cannot be hired in future. 
Tenure is "incentive-compatible" because without it, incumbents would 
never recommend hiring people who might be better than they are, for 
f e a r of be ing r ep laced . Tenure is a l so e f f i c i en t ly " s e l f - e n f o r c i n g " 
because faculty have better information about incumbents than either 
university administrators or outside consultants. Tenure (in the job secu-
rity sense) is therefore necessary to motivate older (perhaps now less 
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productive) faculty to select the best. With budget dollars for staff able 
to be shifted back or forwards across time periods, tenure (with its long 
run feature) secures the truthful revelation of who are the good candi-
dates over all periods, and the university (as an institution) is guaranteed 
that those who are in the best position to judge (namely, faculty rather 
than administrators) have every incentive to make the best decisions. It 
follows, then, that the naive suggestion to get rid of tenure so that older, 
expensive professors can be fired and replaced with younger, cheaper 
professors would be disastrous in the long run.4 
Suppose professors are granted tenure by an efficient self-enforcing 
incent ive-compat ib le process . What prevents these individuals f r o m 
work ing hard until tenure is secured (usually rather early along the 
career path) and exerting the minimum effort thereafter? This raises the 
issue of "sh i rk ing ," and how the wage structure and the promot ion 
process could be designed to reduce shirking.5 This is considered next. 
WAGE STRUCTURES: 
UNDERPAYING AND OVERPAYING PROFESSORS 
The difficulty and high cost of monitoring academic effort on a con-
tinuous basis recommends a certain pattern of contractual employment 
relationship. In particular, the implicit contract requires "delayed pay-
ment" in order to minimize shirking. The optimal form of this contract 
will feature, as a general rule: wages which grow faster than productiv-
ity, pensions , lengthy tenure, higher wages for senior workers , and 
mandatory retirement, but the key point is that at any given moment, 
individuals need not be paid exactly the value of their current produc-
tion. In economic jargon, the spot wage will deviate from the spot value 
of marginal product. For university academics, it means that young, 
junior professors will be "underpaid," and old, senior professors will be 
"overpaid." This phenomenon is not unique to the academy. 
There are several reasons for this structure of contract. For example, 
delayed payment contracts may be necessary if there are signif icant 
f ixed costs, say hiring costs (Hutchens, 1987). Anyone famil iar with 
search and hiring in universities can testify to the high costs (all kinds) 
of this process, even limiting applicants to Ph.D. holders. However, the 
main purpose of delayed payment contracts, in the present context, arises 
f rom the difficulty of monitoring academic effort and performance, and 
to discourage shirking. 
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Consider, for example, a wage profile, V(t), which pays academics 
the value of their marginal productivity (or simply productivity) at each 
moment until retirement at R*. Suppose there is another compensation 
schedule, W(t), which pays academics less than V for some period until 
T*, and then more than V thereafter up to R*. Other things being equal, 
academics should be indifferent to the two wage profiles W(t) and V(t) 
if both have equal net present values. However, if receiving the con-
tracted salary is contingent upon a given performance level, evaluated 
at T* say, then the costs associated with shirking is higher with W(t) 
than V(t). As Lazear (1981, p. 607) points out: "If . . . shirking results 
in . . . dismissal, then the larger is the amount of earnings paid at the 
end of the workl i fe , the greater would be the cost associated with a 
given amount of shirking."6 
Steeper wage profiles lead to less shirking, and flatter wage profiles 
will make employers more honest in the absence of "tenure" in the acad-
emic sense. An interesting question is why academics accept a long term 
contract in which wages are deferred? People generally prefer "money 
up f ron t ; " that is, wages at least equal to current productivity if not 
higher. Leaving aside the notion that it is purely a matter of bargaining 
strength between "strong" university administrations and "weak" faculty 
members , what factors might explain why academic salaries exhibit 
wage profi les steeper than productivity profiles? Unfortunately, some 
answers are purchased only with greater complexity of argument than 
those examined above, and require multi-period models with uncertainty 
of continued employment.7 
TOURNAMENTS, STEAK KNIVES AND RETIREMENT 
A career ladder which awards tenure relatively early has some incen-
tive difficulties. If tenure is achieved by professors in their early thirties, 
there are still thirty or so years of employment left. The wage scale may 
not have suff icient steepness to induce non-shirking. One alternative 
would seem to be promotion, in which faculty are differentiated by rank 
titles and/or pay. How should promotion be structured given the continu-
ing issue of costly and imperfect monitoring? One method might be to 
hold rank order tournaments, in which "prizes" (monetary and non-pecu-
niary) are set in advance but entirely arbitrary, in the sense of bearing no 
relationship to the productivity of either the eventual winner or average 
contestant. Tournaments of this type in which remuneration is based upon 
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ordinal rank in a contest can induce the same efficient allocation as an 
incentive scheme based upon output level (see Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
And it is less costly than measuring individual output. The tournament 
increases university output by encouraging all professors to work harder 
and to avoid shirking, ex ante, even though some professors will not 
achieve successful promotion. But obviously, care must be exercized in 
designing tournament rules and prize structures. It can be shown that, 
generally, players' efforts will depend on the spread between winning and 
losing prizes, and not the level of the winning prize itself (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981, p. 846). 
Compet i t ive tournaments, however, can be beset by quest ionable 
implementation. Indeed some prize structures can be extremely destruc-
tive. David M a m e t ' s play/movie, Glengarry Glenross, is particularly 
instructive. The drama centers around a sales manager f rom head office 
who announces a contest to spur sales. At the end of the contest period, 
the winner will receive a new car, the person with the second highest 
sales will receive a set of steak knives, and the salesperson ranking last 
is fired. The reward structure of this tournament was incentive-compati-
ble, if not collégial; and the spread between winning and losing prizes 
was influential.8 
The delayed compensation contract requires a mandatory retirement 
date to induce workers to leave at the optimum date. However, a specific 
mandatory retirement date is not the major problem with delayed pay-
ment contracts. More important are two other factors, both related to the 
environment outside the university contract. Suppose a tenured faculty 
member receives an outside offer of employment paying a "medium" 
salary that exceeds the faculty member ' s current " low" productivity 
level. This "medium" wage is the valuation of the individual by the out-
side enterprise, and standard economic theory suggests that it is efficient 
for the faculty member to quit the university since the member ' s produc-
tivity is higher outside than inside the university. But the faculty member 
is currently paid a "high" wage because of the delayed compensation 
design. Hence the faculty member will not resign. This immobility leads 
to reduced economic efficiency overall. The situation is exacerbated if, 
as empirical evidence suggests, academics suffer declining productivity, 
(measured by publication activity) possibly as early as 40 years of age 
(McDowell , 1982). The result of the delayed compensation design cou-
pled with declining productivity is as some condemn — professors with 
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lower and lower productivity, getting higher and higher salaries, and 
staying on in universit ies because they are paid too well to consider 
options where their social contribution would be higher.9 
The second feature affecting the optimum termination date also has 
to do with factors beyond the universi ty 's control. A lengthening life 
expectancy due to better health care, changes in government programs 
such as old age pensions, etc. affect the "notch" at the customary retire-
ment age, R. For example, old age pensions create a notch (upward) in 
the reservation wage profile. If old age pensions were to start at a later 
age than R, the notch position would change, and also the desired retire-
ment date. If life expectancy increases, a larger pension is necessary, and 
there is now inducement to work longer rather than retire. 
CONTRACT BARGAINING, BUDGET SQUEEZES AND TENURE 
In many universities, faculty members are represented by an associa-
tion or union (hereafter union). How does tenure distinguish university 
bargaining f rom the run-of-the-mill industrial relations conflict?10 Why 
do administrations feel "squeezed?" The link between declining fiscal 
resources and its direct connection to tenure is sketched in this section 
with a simple model adapted f rom work by McDonald and Solow (1981) 
and Oswald (1993). 
Consider the university's short run position, and concentrate for con-
v e n i e n c e on t h e t e a c h i n g f u n c t i o n . It r e c e i v e s a n n u a l r e v e n u e 
R(L) = p.F(L) , where p =(t + g - c) is the net "payment" received per 
student enrollment comprising tuition (t), government grant (g) and vari-
able cost (c). Variable costs are outlays such as periodical subscriptions 
for the library, utility bills, general maintenance, and the like. It excludes 
capital construction such as a new building or laboratory; these are clas-
sified as long run expenses. F(L) is a differentiable, concave production 
function relating output to faculty input, L. Let w be the wage paid to 
faculty, so the university budget position is simply: B(L) = R(L) - w.L = B*, 
say. There will be many (w, L) combinations satisfying a given univer-
sity budget . Call these combina t ions isobudget lines; these have an 
inverted "U" shape and are shown in Figure 1 
If faculty asks for, and gets, a wage, w*, then the equilibrium out-
come will be on the lowest isobudget curve touching a horizontal line at 
w*, say, point E on isobudget curve B3. It can be shown that a series of 
points traced out by the maxima of the isobudget curves constitute a 
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Figure 1 
Demand for Faculty and Bargaining 
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downward sloping demand curve ( say KD) for faculty labour, and the 
contract is considered "efficient."12 Bargaining models which specify that 
unions attempt to win wage increases as well as employment for its mem-
bers lead to bargaining solutions "off the demand curve," since unions 
must weight the gains from higher wages against the discomfort of hav-
ing fewer members employed. If labour demand is less than supply at the 
equilibrium wage level, workers must be laid off in some manner. 
The level of employment in universities, however, is determined 
almost entirely by management (Giles & Jain, 1989, p. 335). Therefore, 
in a university whose practices include tenure, the union's indifference 
curves will have the following characteristics. Assume, again for conve-
nience, that all faculty are equally productive, and let N* be the employ-
ment level of staff who do not have tenure. Then for employment levels 
above N*, the union's indifference curves are horizontal lines (labeled I, 
II, and III in Figure 1) representing higher and higher wages. When the 
level of labour demand exceeds N*, such as at N**, tenured faculty 
members care little about bargaining over staffing numbers. The optimal 
contract under these circumstances occur at points which lie on the 
demand curve, and hence are efficient. Unions are content to let the uni-
versity determine the number of faculty to hire, and confine their bar-
gaining mainly to compensation rates. 
Now, suppose there is a change in the situation facing universities 
which causes a decline in demand for university output,13 or there is a 
deterioration in the "price" of university output, such as falling tuition, t; 
decreasing government grants, g; or an increase in the non-capital costs 
of providing university infrastructure, c; or all three. This will result in 
the demand curve moving to the left, and the isoprofit curves moving 
upward, and the efficient outcome may move to a point such as H in 
Figure 1. In the case examined by Oswald (1993), where layoffs are pos-
sible but implemented through a seniority rule, N* has the interpretation 
of the median seniority level. The reduced labour force that results after 
laying off some workers will now redefine a new N*, and in the next 
period re-establish an interior solution outcome. 
With the institution of tenure in universities however, there is liter-
ally no accepted (meaning previously agreed to) layoff rule. Corner solu-
tions are not only possible — through movements caused by decreasing 
government support, escalating costs of library and support services, 
etc., and reduced student enrollment, as outlined above — but also, there 
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can be no "next period" resolution because of tenure. Indeed, the 
demand curve is kinked at K and becomes vertical (the segment KQ) 
since the university is constrained to "demand" its entire tenured faculty. 
Tenure also explains why universities can have no recourse to what is 
termed concessionary bargaining ; that is, having unions agree to layoffs, 
job adjustments, and the like. 
This simple model suggests why (a) cutbacks in government grants, 
(b) cost pressures on university budgets, (c) limits to tuition increases, 
and (d) declining interests in attending a less "excellent" university have, 
at the moment, all resulted in pressure on tenure. Because there is no 
previously agreed-to mechanism in place to adjust staff, such as a senior-
ity rule, university administrations and faculty unions are not so much 
bargaining over an acceptable contract outcome as they are contesting 
the very rules of the bargaining game. Accordingly, intuition on both 
sides is correct in thinking that tenure is at stake, for unless tenure is 
reconsidered, we may well find ourselves operating in that zone left of 
N*, which can be justly characterized as "financial crisis".14 
It is possible to argue that universities have already resorted to cer-
tain labour force adjustment methods as a result of fiscal pressures. 
Viewed in terms of industrial relations between union and management, 
there has already been substantial activity which is consistent with the 
bargaining positions one would normally expect of both parties. For 
example, Gunderson (1989, p. 350, p. 367) notes that professional asso-
ciations try to control substitution by management of less highly trained 
(and less expensive) workers for professionals; and that the generaliza-
tion appears "robust" that ". . . union have a positive impact on the com-
pensation of their members and a slight negative impact on the wages of 
nonunion workers." Universities have increasingly responded to finan-
cial pressure by (a) ceasing to hire or replace academic staff, (b) engag-
ing more sessional staff, who are paid at much lower scales and are not 
eligible for tenure. This suggests that universities have pursued a kind of 
"in-house contracting out", but this achievement by stealth would appear 
insufficient, hence universities are now turning to actual concessional 
bargaining with respect to "work adjustment" and layoffs. Of course, it 
is the layoff issue which collides head on with tenure. 
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REDEFINING THE NOTION OF TENURE: 
A MODERATE PROPOSAL 
Tenure awarded through peer review is undoubtedly superior to 
other methods in ensuring that those faculty granted tenure will be of 
the highest standard possible. Furthermore, tenure as currently practiced 
by Canadian universities is incentive-compatible since faculty take part 
in a "contes t" against a standard, rather than an opponent. In the 
absence of measurement error, contests against a fixed standard result 
in a lower contest variance than a tournament against opponents . 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981, p. 857) As already noted, players' efforts (or 
human capital investments) depend on the spread between the winning 
and losing prizes. In the case of tenure, the winning price is long-term 
job security at increasing wage levels with minimum direct day-to-day 
monitoring. The losing prize is immediate mandatory retirement from 
the university. One could not imagine a more stringent spread between 
the winning and losing prizes. Therefore, one need not worry that insuf-
ficient incentives exist in universities with respect to tenure. Indeed, the 
institution of tenure is exemplary of the self-enforcing, incentive-com-
patible contract arrangement, and carried out by an expert peer review 
process at fairly low cost. In fact, without exaggeration, it might be said 
that self-enforcing incentive-compatible arrangements in the university 
are the sine qua non of collegiality and academic freedom — the tradi-
tional hallmarks of excellence. 
But tenure also has its disadvantages. In particular, the back-end 
loaded wage structure for post-tenured faculty is socially inefficient 
because it locks in faculty to the university even when they might be 
more productive elsewhere or doing other things. Further, tenure is a 
problem when it becomes necessary to adjust faculty. Presently, the 
'game' is structured so that one either affirms the sanctity of tenure so 
that no tenured faculty can be terminated, or else university management 
must invoke financial exigency, in which case, tenure is suspended. 
However, there is a middle ground besides this 'corner solution.' Tenure, 
instead, can be reconf igured to yield a more acceptable trade-off 
between its laudable incentive-compatible characteristics on the one 
hand, and its structural rigidity in the face of desirable changes, on the 
other. But first, we need to examine more closely the related issues of 
pay and promotion. 
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Even if tenure is an efficient sorting contest to ensure that the uni-
versities hire, and keep, the best among the young, what prevents older 
faculty members from shirking after they receive tenure? And there is a 
long career interval between achieving tenure and retirement. Promotion 
through the ranks is an unconvincing answer. In many cases, the tenure 
standard is not much different from the standard for promotion to the 
rank of associate professor. So even if the prospect of promotion to full 
professor is thought to be sufficient to prevent shirking among associate 
professors, the question returns with a slight rewording: what prevents 
the numerous (and older) full professors from shirking? The spread 
between the winning and losing prizes, vis-à-vis tenure, appears inconse-
quential. Promotion to full professor often results in little increase in pay 
or non-pecuniary benefits; and there are no horrible consequences from 
being denied promotion, such as being asked to resign. It seems fair to 
conclude that promotion through the ranks has less anti-shirking force 
than does tenure. 
The agency model — or the anti-shirking model, as we have called it 
— requires that there be substantial consequences associated with pro-
motions in order to create some incentive "spread" between winning and 
losing prizes. It is possible to give a large and immediate salary adjust-
ment to those who have been just promoted to the next rank, say to full 
professor. But this does not typically happen. Instead, the spot salary 
changes upward only slightly. Universities seem loathe to associate large 
jumps in spot wages at promotion, contrary to private sector practices. 
However, with tenure, the relevant "spread" was revealed as the differ-
ence between the winning and losing prizes over the remaining career 
life, and not the spread between the spot rates at the time of the contest. 
We are now in a position to sketch a recommendation for reforming 
the institution of university tenure. We recommend: 
1. making the term of tenure related to rank, and 
2. establishing a maximum period of eligibility for promotion. 
More specifically, tenure for an associate professor is deemed to end at, 
say, age 60; while full professors have tenure until, say, 65 years of age. 
The age levels are merely illustrative. Tenure is meant simply as the date 
at which the contract ends; it does not mean that professors must be fired, 
which is the case when tenure is denied. University faculty may still be 
retained after their tenure termination date, but obviously on a new con-
tractual basis. Since tenure is associated with rank, it is desirable also to 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXVIII, No. 2,3, 1998 
62 D, Hum 
specify a maximum eligibility period during which a faculty may apply 
for promotion; for example, an associate professor may only apply for 
promotion to full professor within 10 years of achieving the associate 
rank. Again the number is arbitrary, for argument purposes. Coupled with 
salary spreads by rank, the above modest change should lessen overall 
shirking and introduce more flexibility in union-management relations. 
Why is this modest reform an improvement over present arrange-
ments? First, the laudable features of tenure already noted are preserved. 
Faculty with tenure may now teach and research with some sense of job 
stability, and in the knowledge that their "performance bond" will be 
returned through higher future wages. However, the view that insuffi-
ciently strong incentives to prevent shirking exist after the tenure point 
remains; and promotion rules which dictate a time limit for promotion 
moves the promotion process closer to that of tenure, where I submit that 
incentives to achieve are especially strong. The prize for success in pro-
motion is not only immediate financial reward, but also longer guaran-
teed employment as well, the objective being to strengthen the incentive 
structure through increasing the spread. This change is incentive-com-
patible as well from the self-enforcing perspective. Promotion is no 
longer merely an individual achievement. It will also affect the standards 
applied to promotion as departments will now be forced to confront the 
consequences of their decision. It is not just a matter of rank and title, 
nor is it merely an issue of higher pay through larger increments and a 
higher salary cap for the university. It will also be a judgment whether 
the particular colleague will be welcomed for a career of contribution 
that is longer rather than shorter in duration. Departments will therefore 
have an interest in ensuring that promotion standards are high since they 
will suffer the consequences of lax standards by having less productive 
colleagues for longer periods. 
This brings us to the industrial relations aspect of contract bargain-
ing. Our above discussion suggests that gridlock occurs when the con-
junction of declining enrollments, shrinking grants, declining reputation, 
escalating costs, as well as externally imposed constraints on tuition 
increases or admission policies require a new contract point which is 
outside the "core" of the bargaining zone. Tenure plays a special role in 
that no agreed-upon rule exists for adjusting staff, such as seniority or 
first in- first out conventions when it comes to tenured academic faculty. 
Relating the term of tenure to rank introduces a degree of freedom. 
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Under the reformed tenure system, professors whose tenured period 
has expired will no longer be guaranteed employment in the sense that 
they now belong to the pool from which first layoffs, if necessary, will 
occur. In essence, their seniority is truncated. This introduces a quasi-
seniority rule for possible layoffs. But rather than the traditional "last 
hired - first fired" system, which discriminates against the young and 
less senior, our proposal concentrates potential layoffs among the more 
senior, the higher paid and either less hard working or less talented.15 If 
layoffs should occur, the revised tenure conditions will also have the 
salutary effect of lowering the average age of the faculty. If hiring possi-
bilities emerge, and supposing that new faculty members take these posi-
tions rather than all formerly laid off members returning, the average 
quality of faculty should improve, on the assumption that academic pro-
ductivity peaks before 60. Our proposed reform to tenure is therefore 
complimentary to the pursuit of an overall excellent faculty. 
The proposed reform of tenure, despite its language, is no stranger 
to university practice. Universities routinely appoint individuals, even 
some recently retired, on non-tenured contracts. The post-tenure 
appointment simply adds to the vocabulary of contractual arrangements, 
which now already includes post-retirement appointments. However, 
there are implications. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODERATE PROPOSAL 
Linking the length of tenure to rank will have "incentive-compatible" 
effects since increasing the spread in "prizes" between ranks will moti-
vate greater achievement. At the same time, limiting the length of tenure 
has implications because it now severs tenure from the notion of lifetime 
job security. Some additional points should be noted. First, professors at 
the end of their tenure status are not necessarily retired or fired; they 
may choose to stay on but their guarantee of job security is no longer 
absolute. Thus, the notion of tenure qua life-long job security and the 
status of being employed is severed. Second, should they completely 
retire (rather than seek another career), their pension start date may not 
coincide with their university end date. This problem is not unique to 
university professors, and befalls anyone whose job termination does not 
match their normal retirement date. At least, in this case, university pro-
fessors know in advance their tenure-end date and can plan accordingly. 
With improving health standards, some have suggested that normal 
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retirement dates be indexed to life expectancy. This approach is probably 
only appropriate when considering government-provided old age pen-
sions, and is probably less relevant in the present context. 
To see this, consider the following. If tenure is a life-long job secu-
rity concept, then the tenure-termination date is effectively the retire-
ment date. With mandatory retirement, pension benefits replace salary, 
and university duties also cease in a seamless transition. If individuals 
retire early, they must accept a smaller pension. Exactly the same effect 
will occur by fixing the date of retirement and extending life expectancy, 
so the issue is one of adequate post-job income, not tenure per se. If, as 
is often assumed, productivity peaks for academics well before the nor-
mal retirement age now adopted by Canadian universities, life-long 
tenure (and no mandatory retirement) is inimical to increasing life 
expectancy. It may well be socially efficient for less productive profes-
sors to seek other jobs at their tenure-termination date. 
The issue is real ly one of career p roduct iv i ty , pay, and l i fe 
expectancy. An analogy to sports is perhaps helpful. Professional ath-
letes have short career spans of high productivity (and high pay) relative 
to their normal life expectancy. When they retire from professional ath-
letics, many must pursue other careers at lower pay. If life expectancy of 
professors were to increase to 120 years, say, the problem would be 
identical. Professors at the end of their tenure-termination date no longer 
have a "no cut" contract; they are simply "picked up" on a year by year 
basis, or they may choose to pursue other jobs. There is life after tenure. 
A third implication of linking the length of tenure with rank, and 
eliminating the concept of absolute lifetime job security is its effect on 
salary structure. Professional athletes accept the spectre of declining per-
formance and consequent job loss because they receive their full value 
of marginal product while employed. There is no deferred payment fea-
ture. (I abstract from the deferred payment features due to tax sheltering 
considerations.) Professors do not enjoy spot wages equal to spot pro-
ductivity. Consequently, adjustments to the salary structure of academics 
will be necessary, and this could take several forms. More of the pay 
could be "front loaded", in which case the resulting flatter wage scale 
would reduce incentive signals, even though promotion and tenure-
duration remain as incentive-compatible ingredients. Another possibility 
is to return a larger "bond" at the retirement date, or to grant a termina-
tion or severance package, bearing in mind that tenure-termination does 
not necessarily mean employment-termination under the above proposal. 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXVIII, No. 2,3, 1998 
Tenure, Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Conflict 65 
The last point raises the following interesting question. What might 
be some of the legitimate reasons why a university might want to get rid 
of a particular professor or groups of professors? Again ignore malfea-
sance; that leaves shirking or genuine 'financial exigency'. But tenure is 
not really necessary if one suspects that mere money savings is the uni-
versity's motivation for dismissal. There are other ways to structure an 
incentive-compatible contract. Consider the case of successful athletic 
coaches in highly competitive collegiate conferences. Winning teams 
cannot always be guaranteed in any given year (spot productivity); yet 
some staff stability (long term contracts) is desirable. But if a head 
coaching change were thought necessary, tenure would be an absolute 
hindrance since the university could not get rid of a losing coach and 
bring in a new one. Some highly competitive schools are thought to 
have contracts structured in the following way. (One never knows for 
certain, as these are individual arrangements.) Some minimum bench-
mark is agreed to, either formally or informally, such as a winning sea-
son (that is, wins exceed losses), f inal ranking in one 's home 
conference, invitation to the regional qualifying tournaments, etc. There 
may also be special merit achievements (such as, selection for national 
finals, making the "sweet sixteen", or bowl appearances). A coach does 
not have tenure but, say, a five or ten-year contract instead. Each year 
that the coach reaches or exceeds a stipulated performance level, the 
contract is "torn up" and another five or ten-year contract signed, not 
necessarily at the old salary. 
What are the incentive-compatible features of this arrangement? The 
coach will obviously have an incentive to perform at a high level for the 
rewards are additional job security and pay. By rolling over the contract 
with good performance, the coach effectively determines the value of the 
severance payment or personal "departure bond." For the university, if a 
change is thought necessary, either because present and expected perfor-
mance is below acceptable standards, actual change is indeed possible 
and no way hindered by tenure. The cost, however, is the payout of the 
remaining life of the contract. Hence, it is unlikely that dismissal will 
take place for marginal savings of salary alone, but rather for necessary 
'program and structural' changes. 
My proposal for reforming tenure works "at the margin", as econo-
mists would say. It is not especially revolutionary, and aims at altering 
the balance between strengthening incentives to motivate faculty, and 
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introducing flexibility to the bargaining framework. Many will have 
other suggestions, especially university administrators, lawyers and 
labour arbitrators, faculty union leaders, and, of course, politicians and 
the public. This proposal is moderate rather than radical, intending to be 
measured rather than hysterical. It will be a disappointment to those 
wanting the complete abolition of tenure for university professors; how-
ever, it will also be disappointing to those who wish the status quo.16 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This essay explains why tenure is useful and worth defending. The 
approach has been to eschew the conventional appeals to academic free-
dom, collegiality or right of free expression. Since Skinner's (1966) 
essay on meaning and understanding in the history of ideas, it is hard to 
take too seriously anyone who would claim to tell us what tenure actu-
ally "means," or what one ought to "understand" about tenure. My pur-
pose, then, is to pose the issue as a matter of contract design. By 
explaining its rationale in terms of incentive structures which are less 
costly than other alternatives because of the informational costs of mak-
ing judgments, and by explaining the rationale behind deferred compen-
sation, I hope to make tenure and pay structures more transparent for 
purposes of reform. Many organizations other than universities have de 
facto tenure as well as pay schemes that do not equate spot productivity 
with spot wages. But because the pay schemes of the corporate sector 
may be equally mysterious, I have employed analogies to professional 
sports for exposition purposes. In many ways, the practices of universi-
ties are not as exceptional as many would like to believe. Many employ-
ers are willing to grant employees job security if they perform their 
duties to high standards. It just happens that the job of university schol-
ars is to "think" and to "express freely" their ideas. 
Finally, my analysis is what economists term "partial analysis", 
since it take no account of what other universities or parties might do if 
my suggested reforms were implemented. The implicit assumption is 
that other universities will be also persuaded by my arguments and enact 
similar changes, otherwise any university which was seen to provide less 
"tenure" protection than universities elsewhere would be at a competi-
tive disadvantage. 
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Notes 
' In a recent polemic on Canada's universities, Emberley (1996, p.61) 
devotes an entire chapter to academic privilege, listing tenure in first place 
among universities' 'perception problems'. Emberley's book contains an up-to-
date description of tensions in Canadian universities, citing numerous sources 
expressing concern with tenure matters. There has even been a bitter faculty 
strike at the University of Manitoba over tenure issues. Meanwhile, discussions 
appear to go further in the United States, with concrete steps being taken to 
have post-tenure reviews and removal after two unfavourable yearly reviews 
(Texas), or suggestions to make the probationary period as long as nine years 
(Minnesota). See the symposium "Tenure Trouble" in Political Science and 
Politics (March 1997). 
'y 
This paper is part of ongoing research on tenure and pay in Canadian 
universities. My focus here is restricted to tenure as part of a self-enforcing, 
incentive compatible form of contract. 
3 Promotion through the ranks is again similar in rationale, but here the 
stakes are less. Since application for promotion is not a time-limited procedure 
like tenure, a rejected promotion application does not mean termination, and 
some individuals might even choose not to seek promotion. On the other hand, 
the wage structure may still play a critical role in fostering the right incentives. 
4 Carmichael's (1988) analysis is deeper than I have described here. It 
might be helpful to rephrase some of these arguments in a non-academic context. 
Large Japanese firms understand the role of life long job security, knowing that 
senior workers will pass on their knowledge and skills to younger workers only 
on the understanding that their own jobs are safe. Here the incentive argument 
turns on specific training; in the main text it turns on information assymetries. 
^ Possibly disagreeable to those who are not lawyers or economists, the 
term 'shirking and malfeasance' is standard in the contract literature and is used 
here without prejudice. I use the term "shirking" simply to describe academics 
not putting forth maximum honest effort according to the customary university 
norm, or standards of 'excellence'. I ignore malfeasance. 
6 Universities may also be tempted to act in bad faith. For example, if 
professors never communicated with each other about their university contracts, 
a dishonest university which cares nothing for its reputation, could terminate all 
its professors just before their tenure decision date. But this is unlikely to bene-
fit universities in the longer run, so is not a feasible strategy. 
7 Individuals must attempt to balance a desire for consumption smooth-
ing with a desire for some form of wage insurance over the life cycle. More 
formally, individuals are assumed to maximize lifetime satisfaction over two 
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periods: U = u ( c l ) + u (c2) subject to a budget constraint w = wl + w2. 
Possibilities are limited if no borrowing requires ci = wi. Hence some access to 
a "capital market" to aid consumption smoothing is desirable. Complications 
set in when second period contracts cannot be made binding in period one (slav-
ery and indentured service is not allowed). This uncertainty means that the indi-
vidual must now maximize expected lifetime satisfaction: U = u(cl) + Eu(w2) 
where Eu(w2) is the expected satisfaction to be had from the second period 
wage ,w2. Of course, w2 is not simple to compute or calculate, depending as it 
does on the state of the labour market for the particular individual's services, 
the distribution of wages offers expected, and the like. Under these circum-
stances, a risk-adverse individual will seek to purchase some insurance as well. 
For more details see Lam et al., (1995). 
Q 
° David Mamet is also the author of Oleanna , a more literal depiction of 
university culture. In that play, political correctness, misunderstanding, and 
worrisome distractions arising from an impending tenure hearing results in 
anger and violence from a young professor towards a student. 
9 Johnson and Stafford (1974) estimate an elasticity of substitution for 
junior and senior faculty in providing instruction in economics, sociology, biol-
ogy, physics, and mathematics. They find that . . junior and senior faculty are 
quite substitutable in the academic production process." 
Universities that have tenure for individual faculty but not a collective 
agreement will encounter the same difficulties discussed here. The difference 
will be reflected in the nature of the costly responses; for example, to fire 
tenured professors will incur public relations costs and political costs and per-
haps individual unlawful dismissal lawsuits rather than legal challenges by 
unions, faculty strikes, etc. In either case, the issue remains: what rigidity does 
tenure constitute? 
1 1 The slope of the isobudget line is dw/dL = [R'(L) - w] /L . Hence for 
any L, the slope is positive until w reaches R'(L), and negative thereafter. 
Lower isobudget curves are better for the university in terms of having a sur-
plus, and higher ones are worse in the sense of incurring a deficit. 
^ Since the equilibrium is on the demand curve, these situations are said 
to be "efficient" contracts. 
This could be due to declining "excellence." We can solve F'(L) = w to 
get the demand curve for labour D = D (w, X) where X is a parameter of "excel-
lence" with the convention that as excellence X falls, the demand for L falls as 
well. 
I do not mean to imply that universities literally see their demand for 
faculty as falling short of present tenured supply. No doubt universities have 
been adjusting through the hiring process (implementing a no hires policy), 
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substitution of labour (using sessionals or graduate students), adopting just-in-
time production methods (hiring lecturers or instructors on the first day of 
class, if necessary), changing work rules (larger classes, cutting programs), and 
stepping up financial monitoring (such as restricting smart individual sourcing) 
on the silly assumption that compliance costs are zero. Universities are also 
soliticiting funds from all sources, charging full costs for certain programs, and 
in some cases, cranking up their public relations and advertising efforts. 
There are many possible reasons why older professors might be less 
producive in the sense of publishing less. The Scottish philosopher and historian 
David Hume (1711-76) gave four of them. After achieving a certain degree of 
financial comfort from his pensions, Hume was asked to continue and update 
his popular History of Great Britain but he said " . . . I have four reasons for not 
writing: I am too old, too fat, too lazy, and too rich". 
I had originally called my suggestion a 'modest proposal' but changed 
it instead to a 'moderate proposal' so as not to summon up associations with 
Jonathan Swift. A loose reading of Swift might encourage university adminis-
trations to pounce on their young and untenured faculty when it is clear that my 
reforms are directed towards shedding the more senior and the less productive. 
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